Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World by Mamounas, Joseph
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 13 | Number 2 Article 7
2007
Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic
Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining National
Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World
Joseph Mamounas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized
and Oil Dependent World, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 381 (2007)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol13/iss2/7
CONTROLLING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF
U.S. STRATEGIC ASSETS: THE
CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING NATIONAL
SECURITY IN A GLOBALIZED AND OIL
DEPENDENT WORLD
Joseph Mamounas *
HE protection of American domestic and international interests is
one of the foremost roles of the U.S. government. As enumerated
in the Constitution, one of our government's purposes is to pro-
vide for "the common defense."1 This responsibility has been tested myr-
iad times-yet today is wrought with some of the most complex and
unpredictable national security challenges in American history. The
United States is embroiled in armed conflict with stateless enemies who
will resort to unprecedented tactics to achieve their extreme goals. With
the fate of our society, our people, and our way of life at stake, the dy-
namic of our alliances has changed. Anxiety and paranoia are rampant.
In the 21st century, America arguably can never be overprotected.
Like a well-tempered machine, American economic foreign policy is
conditioned by the rise and fall of national security events. The juxtaposi-
tion of our booming economy in the 1990s and guarded economic stance
after September 11, 2001, reflects this. To respond to threats and imple-
ment these adaptations as quickly as necessary, federal law has developed
to provide our government with the tools it needs to act on a moment's
notice. The economic weapon is among the most powerful asset that the
federal government possesses in protecting national security.2 In prac-
tice, the President has the power to terminate business transactions, par-
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1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. Joseph Kahn & Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged. The Assets; U.S. Freezes More
Accounts; Saudi and Pakistani Assets Cited for Ties to Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2001, at Al. In our current War on Terror, for example, the federal govern-
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ticularly mergers and takeovers, that he believes are a threat to national
security. 3 Greater scrutiny is accorded to economic transactions involv-
ing strategic assets: the federal government has enacted laws to protect
American farmland, airlines, telecommunications, and defense-related
corporations from adverse foreign investment. The net result of this his-
tory is a legal infrastructure that arms our government with the tools nec-
essary to protect our national security interests and to secure our nation's
strategic assets.
A hasty response to unique national security challenges would require
the United States to take an isolationist stance towards foreign invest-
ment in order to best protect its national security. But the disposition of
today's world economy makes such a course alteration impossible. Our
world is globalized and interconnected. Furthermore, America is eco-
nomically interdependent on foreign nations like never before. Our reli-
ance on foreign natural resources, manufacturing, and consumerism (as
evidenced by our massive trade deficit with China, for example) makes us
a central player in global economics. 4 Consequently, the American econ-
omy is inextricably and necessarily involved in global economics.
This article will address the natural security implications of interna-
tional economic transactions. In considering the risks of globalization to
our national security, this article contextualizes strategic assets. Addi-
tionally, this article discusses the legislative history and case law relating
to the approach our law has taken vis-A-vis foreign ownership in order to
illuminate our current foreign investment posture. Furthermore, this arti-
cle analyzes, in particular, the July 2005 offer the Chinese National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) made to purchase Unocal, an
American oil company. Finally, in view of the foregoing, this article takes
a fresh, globalization-infused look at the strength of in-place economic
legislation and its ability to protect America against emerging national
security challenges in the future.
I. GLOBALIZATION
Globalization is the process by and through which individual national
economies create economic webs with other countries. 5 Globalization in-
tegrates markets, transportation systems, and communications systems,
makes national boundaries immaterial, and is typically "accompanied by
a strongly homogenized and homogenizing language, symbol-set, and cul-
ture."'6 Globalization is driven by a variety of diverse factors, like geogra-
ment, in a concerted effort with foreign nations, has successfully frozen billions of
dollars belonging to or that would otherwise be funneled to terrorists. Id.
3. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
4. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Declines a Chance to Criticize Yuan Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2005, at C1.
5. See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, "Globalization": A Future Trend or a Satisfying Mi-
rage?, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 313 (2001).
6. Wayne N. Renke, Special Issue Globalization and the Law: Book Review, 41 AL-
BERTA L. REV. 771, 771 (2003) (reviewing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERROR-
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phy and technology, and is underpinned by the promise of increased
economic output at the lowest possible cost via more expedient trade
mechanisms. 7 Fast communication and commodities delivery makes
globalization not only possible, but also cost effective. American compa-
nies save significant amounts of money by manufacturing goods abroad
and having them shipped back to the United States at a fraction of the
cost to manufacture them at home.
In many respects, globalization's impact on the world is overwhelm-
ingly positive. For example, globalization "enlarg[es] the world economy,
promot[es] technological innovations, foster[s] universal political partici-
pation, and enhanc[es] international cooperation."'8 Globalization also
makes our economy more sophisticated and robust by diverting human
capital into high-tech sectors and away from lower-skilled jobs. 9 Conse-
quently, average American workers are able to participate in and benefit
from globalization's technological innovation. Increased global coopera-
tion and access to global resource markets also allow for accelerated in-
novation and technological development while keeping costs low.
On the other hand, globalization also has many drawbacks. For one
thing, globalization increases international pressure to compete, 10 which
fuels companies' quest for more and more lucrative arbitrage." For ex-
ample, globalization can have a negative impact on the enforcement of
global fair labor practices, in essence "destroy[ing] employment guaran-
tees of adequate wages and working conditions" at home and abroad.12
As a result, third-world countries become increasingly marginalized at
the hands of first-world economic gain. At home, globalization also de-
values the American workforce by threatening low-wage workers and fa-
cilitating the disparity between low-wage and high-wage labor.13 Though
the American economy may become more robust due to globalization,
"'wage levels are being lowered rather than raised,' and higher skills have
not necessarily led to higher wages."'1 4 Consequently, globalization pre-
ISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE
(2002)).
7. Lucy B. Bednarek, The Gender Wage Gap: Searching for Equality in a Global
Economy, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 217 (1998). "The significance of
globalization, then, rests in the way the global economy alters the production of
goods and assets around the world." Id.
8. Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terrorism, and the
Movements of People, 36 INT'L LAW. 91, 92 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 422 (2002).
10. Bednarek, supra note 7, at 216.
11. Id. "Arbitrage is 'the practice of buying a commodity in one local market where it
is cheap, then selling it in a neighboring market where the price is higher and
profiting from the fractional difference."' Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 219.
14. Id. at 219-20. Globalization consequently
creates an increased disparity between the rich and the poor by perpetu-
ating poverty and widening material inequalities. Medium to high-
skilled workers have been replaced by cheap, unskilled labor, and the
educationally and skilled elite drift farther and farther away. As global-
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vents low-wage workers from "escap[ing] from the poverty to which the
globalizing economy relegates them."15 In sum, by forcing America to
export jobs for economic gain, millions of citizens have lost steady work
(due to lack of education, skills, and opportunities) at home 16 and a race
to the bottom has been ignited abroad.' 7
Globalization's potential impact on national security is perhaps one of
its most striking drawbacks. The hallmarks of globalization-increased
trade and an easier flow of individuals and capital-also bring increased
opportunities for crime, such as "smuggling, drug and arms dealing,
money laundering, and computer/Internet crimes."'18 Perhaps somewhat
more notably, "globalization can [also] facilitate the ability of drug traf-
fickers, terrorist, and other criminal organizations to operate in relatively
unregulated environments."1 9 The same benefits of globalization that
economies have come to.enjoy have also made it possible for individuals
and small groups to build tremendous fortunes.20 Globalization even has
the potential to facilitate terrorism and impede anti-terrorism efforts "by
making the movement of people and funds much easier."'z In order to
prevent terrorism while also maintaining globalization's benefits,
America and the world economy at large must be careful to balance na-
tional security concerns with trade liberalization in order to strike the
best fit compromise between the two.
Whatever the benefits of globalization, it is clear that no national secur-
ity analysis can take place outside the context of the globalized world
economy. The fact that globalization opens our economy to malicious
foreign investment strikes at the heart of any foreign direct investment
(FDI) review. To be sure, globalization augments the channels by which
illegitimate small-scale foreign investment may occur, but it can also facil-
itate large-scale mergers and acquisitions. The risks of these transactions
are potentially significant. Foreign ownership of an American corpora-
tion provides a presence for that parent corporation's country in the
United States. The consequences of such ownership are troublesome if
the purchasing country's interests are adverse to America. Without the
ization depresses wages in the United States, it forms an international-




17. Id. at 217. "The dynamics of globalization ultimately create a new international
labor pool into which companies delve for a cheap work force." Id.
18. Renke, supra note 6, at 771.
19. Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 8, at 92-93.
20. Id. at 93.
21. Id.
Several trends associated with globalization-the greater ease of moving
people, resources, and information across borders, the greater transna-
tional reach of institutional structures-thus have sustained or worsened
international terrorism even as other trends, such as the precipitous de-
cline of Marxist terrorism at the end of the Cold War, have tended to
lessen it.
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effective government controls necessary to review transactions, stymie
malicious foreign investment, and maintain America's safety, America
will face dire national security consequences.
With respect to globalization itself, the challenge "is to take advantage
of globalization's opportunities while minimizing its risks and disadvan-
tages."122 To do so, legislative efforts should be concentrated on ensuring
the enforcement of fair labor practices at home and abroad and on en-
couraging the restriction of foreign investment pending thorough review.
We must focus on ensuring that the temptation of immediate or quick
economic gain does not trump our long-term perception of national se-
curity goals. In particular, we must maintain stringent control over our
national strategic assets by enacting a clear legal infrastructure that en-
courages their preservation and stabilizes globalization's impact on for-
eign access to our most important resources, while also encouraging an
open society and liberal trade.
II. STRATEGIC ASSETS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCE ON OIL
The ways that strategic assets and the role these assets play in national
security are defined depend on the context that these two interrelated
ideas are placed. Strategic assets are generally any tangible or intangible
asset or concern of significant value in a given industry, state, or nation.
Intelligence gathering and analysis,2 3 the ability to use weapons systems
more effectively,2 4 pharmaceutical, biotech, and genomic firms, 2 5 bi-
oweapons,2 6 environmental knowledge,2 7 Pakistani nuclear weapons and
missiles,2 8 and even the U.S. Constitution2 9 have all been described as
strategic assets. Uniting these diverse interests is an apparent tactical ad-
vantage that each holds under a particular set of circumstances. 30 In
22. Id. at 101.
23. David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 651 (2005).
24. Erwin Dahinden, The Future of Arms Control Law: Towards a New Regulatory
Approach and New Regulatory Techniques, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 263,
268 (2005).
25. Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 How. L.J. 579,
587 (2005).
26. Timothy K. Gilman, Search, Sentence, and (Don't) Sell: Combating the Threat of
Biological Weapons Through Inspections, Criminalization, and Restrictions on
Equipment, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y. 217, 229-31 (2003).
27. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 207 (2004).
28. Terence N. Cushing, Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf Deceitful Dictator or
Father of Democracy?, 21 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 621, 635 (2003).
29. Mary L. Dudziak, The Court and Social Context in Civil Rights History, 72 U. CHI.
L. REv. 429, 448 (2005). "During times of crisis, the United States has invoked the
Constitution to assure other nations that all is right in America." Id.
30. This is specifically what the word strategic implies: a calculated, tactical advantage
in a given circumstance, typically provided by owning or controlling the right re-
sources at the right time.
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many cases, such as the bioweapons and the Pakistani nuclear weapons
referenced above, these strategic assets are not always characterized as
such because of the benefits of their use, but rather because of their sym-
bolic, implied ability to exert influence. Thus, strategic assets provide an
advantage both because of the raw force and power of their usage 3' and
the implicit persuasive power that they hold.
Strategic assets obviously do not have to be manmade. It is not unten-
able, for example, that Saudi Arabia's oil reserves-the largest cache of
any nation by far 32-provide it with an asset whose strategic value,
though somewhat limited by international agreements and organizational
memberships, is appreciable. If, for example, all worldwide oil supplies
were exhausted, and the world had to rely on Saudi Arabia for oil, the
strategic value of its oil would increase. Nonetheless, treating oil as a
strategic asset is a new concept because, as economists and industry spe-
cialists point out, "owning oil is not vital to national security as long as
there is a sufficient supply of oil on the global market. ' 33 In other words,
in the absence of crisis, oil will remain a non-strategic asset, these experts
contend, because it is abundant and readily available on global markets.
As demonstrated in the Saudi Arabia example, however, shortages-or
even market fluctuations-could essentially convert oil into a strategic
asset. 34 Worldwide demand for oil has been recognized to be at its high-
est levels in history while worldwide excess capacity of oil production has
been recognized to be at its lowest point in history. Consequently, even
in the absence of an official shortage, oil is arguably a strategic asset,
particularly to an oil dependent nation like the United States.35 Under
prevailing circumstances, then, oil has assumed a greater strategic value
than previously considered. As a strategic asset, all nations, regardless of
their oil reserves, must be conscientious of their access to and control of
oil reserves in order to maintain the stability of the global economy and
individual national security.
31. Dudziak, supra note 29, at 472. The Constitution was a strategic asset, for exam-
ple, because it maintained the rule of law during crisis, thus providing an advan-
tage over less legally developed countries and demonstrating the stability of
American society. Id.
32. Rank Order - Oil - Proved Reserves, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, Mar. 15, 2007,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html.
33. Peggy J. Crawford & Terry Young, Fair Trade or Strategic Concern: The Unocal
War, GRAZIADIO Bus. REPORT, http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/053/hottopic2.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2007).
34. Mark E. Rosen, Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment in U.S. Defense and
High Technology Firms: Who's Minding the Store?, 4 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 75,
88 (1993). Other crises have indirectly made oil a strategic asset, too. When Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush announced to the nation on August 8, 1990, for example,
that he was deploying troops in the Gulf War, he explained: "[t]he stakes are high.
Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second larg-
est reserves of oil and over a million men under arms .... Our country now im-
ports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic
independence." Id. at 88.
35. H. R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005).
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In deciding what strategic assets it can reasonably afford to sacrifice, an
individual nation must not only consider the asset's value to it, but also
the strategic value of that asset to the purchasing country. If an asset
does in fact hold strategic value, then it necessarily is important to the
country holding that asset. 36 In many cases-perhaps in every strategic
asset example listed above-strategic assets have national security impli-
cations because of their tactical value. In weighing the sale of a strategic
asset, then, a country must consider the extent and severity of the sale's
national security implications. Nuclear weapons, for example, have obvi-
ous national security implications, particularly with respect to a country's
military might. Pakistan, for example, is able to wield greater influence-
both regionally and globally-because it has nuclear weapons. If Paki-
stan were to sell these nuclear weapons, whether to India, its regional
rival, or to the United States, its ally, not only would Pakistan's influence
be severely limited, but its national security may also be in jeopardy.
The interplay of national security and strategic assets in the United
States is necessarily much more complicated than this simplistic example.
America's rise to economic preeminence on the global stage since the
beginning of the Cold War has noticeably contributed to its increased se-
curity risks. This rise in status has gone hand-in-hand with the increasing
speed with which the world economy has been overtaken by the influence
of globalization. While today America is challenged to maintain a bal-
ance between security and productivity, we must be cognizant of the his-
torical events that have created our national security situation and the
response that our government has taken towards them. International de-
pendence on oil has made it a jewel in the crown of American strategic
assets, and it is imperative to contextualize the protections we historically
afforded to other strategic assets-while also considering other pressures,
such as policy and politics37-in order to understand our legal approach
to oil. Since America realistically cannot defend its assets through war-
fare as a first resort, we must look to legal mechanisms to protect our
interests.
III. PROTECTING AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY BY
CONTROLLING FOREIGN ECONOMIC INVESTMENT
A. THE EXON-FLORio AMENDMENT
The Exon-Florio Amendment (Exon-Florio) lies at the center of the
U.S. government's foreign economic investment controls. As an amend-
ment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, Exon-Florio was enacted in
36. I use holding broadly as a geographic term to refer to the country in which an asset
is located. Accordingly, legal ownership is not required.
37. Rosen, supra note 34, at 88. Since the Truman Doctrine, for example, the United
States, through its national security policy, has operated "under the simple premise
that national security is inextricably linked to world order." Id. In order to meet
its defense worldwide challenges-a crucial requirement for America's national
security-America must have "assured access to strategic materials/protection of
vital industries." Id.
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1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act "as a na-
tional security filter on FDI". 38 To effectuate this purpose, Exon-Florio
gives the President specific powers to review transactions "that could af-
fect the national security of the United States."' 39 Operating within the
context of the United States' traditionally open investment policy and the
increasingly liberalized global economy, "[t]he intent of Exon-Florio is
not to discourage FDI generally, but to provide a mechanism to review
and, if the President finds necessary, to restrict FDI that threatens the
national security."'40
Though some contend that "Exon-Florio negates a longstanding U.S.
policy of welcoming and protecting FDI[,]" 41 Exon-Florio was borne out
of circumstantial necessity. In 1986, Fujitsu, a Japan-based electronics
corporation, made a purchase offer for the Fairchild Semiconductor Cor-
poration.42 Because Fairchild was widely viewed as Silicon Valley's
mother company, U.S. concern over the transaction was widespread.43
After inconclusive investigations by the Council on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) and a Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust review, it
became clear that "no legal authority existed for preventing the transac-
tion."' 44 The Reagan Administration was therefore compelled to con-
clude "that it was 'powerless to take any action[,]" 45 thus forming the
impetus that motivated the enactment of Exon-Florio.46
Exon-Florio allows the President or his designee to "make an investi-
gation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
38. Id. at 76.
39. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b).
40. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury: Committee on Foreign Investments in the United
States (CFIUS), http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio (last
visited Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter CFIUS].
41. Rosen, supra note 34, at 77.
42. Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investments
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 56
(1989).
43. Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-
September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM.
J.TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 202 (2002) (citations omitted). Specific opposition to the
Fujitsu-Fairchild deal was grounded in two concerns: control of the semiconductor
industry was vital "to the future development of high-tech weaponry, as well as the
computer chip market," and the transaction would "create American dependence
on Japanese suppliers for the production of, and access to, a vital dual-use technol-
ogy." Id.
44. Id. at 203.
45. Id. Prior to Exon-Florio's enactment, "the President possessed the authority to
investigate, regulate and prevent foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies under [the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §1701 (1977)
(IEEPA)]." Id. Invoking IEEPA, however, is not a politically attractive choice, as
it requires the President to make a "declaration of a national emergency after a
presidential finding of an 'unusual or extraordinary threat' to national security."
Id. Making such a declaration is particularly unsavory because it is "virtually the
equivalent of a declaration of hostilities against the government of the acquirer
company." Id. (citations omitted).
46. Rosen, supra note 34, at 79. The enactment of Exon-Florio was foreshadowed by
several other events. In President Reagan's 1987 State of the Union address, for
example, he "promise[d] that the U.S. would not longer be 'trade patsies."' Id.
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tions, and takeovers proposed... by or with foreign persons which could
result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States."'4 7 Given the time-intensive nature of business transac-
tions and the speed that international markets change, Exon-Florio gives
consideration to the parties' time constraints. In fact, the investigation
prescribed under Exon-Florio must begin no later than thirty days after
the President is notified of the merger, and it cannot take more than
forty-five days to complete it after the President has determined that such
investigation is necessary. 48 Under the terms of Exon-Florio, such an in-
vestigation is mandatory if the "merger, acquisition, or takeover.., could
affect the national security of the United States."
49
Within fifteen days after this investigation is complete, the President
has the power to block the proposed transaction 50 given a finding that:
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that
the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threat-
ens to impair the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than ... the International Emergency
Economic Power Act .... do not ... provide adequate and appropri-
ate authority ... to protect the national security.
51
The President's power to block a transaction, made after a decision in
accordance with these findings, is insulated from judicial review by Exon-
Florio.52 In making such a finding, the President may consider the fol-
lowing factors:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet na-
tional defense requirements, including the availability of human re-
sources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and
services,
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by for-
eign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security,
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on
sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any country...
identified . . . as a country that supports terrorism ... [or] as a coun-
47. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
48. Id.
49. Id. app. § 2170(b).
50. Id. app. § 2170(d).
[T]he President may take such action for such time as the President con-
siders appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or
takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States . . . by or with foreign persons so that such control will not
threaten to impair the national security.... The President may direct the
Attorney General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief,
in the district courts of the United States.
Id.
51. Id. app. § 2170(e).
52. Id.
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try of concern regarding missile proliferation; or... as a country of
concern regarding the proliferation of chemical and biological weap-
ons ... and
(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on
United States international technological leadership in areas affect-
ing United States national security.53
Additionally, the President must submit a written report listing the rea-
sons in support of the decision to block the transaction. 54 In particular,
the President must provide a thorough explanation of his findings regard-
ing the factors in that report.55
The 1993 Defense Authorization Act modified Exon-Florio by making
additions more commonly known as the Byrd Amendment. These modi-
fications were largely encouraged by Congress's "dissatisfaction with the
review process track record after four years."'56 In particular, the Byrd
Amendment made three changes to Exon-Florio. First, it "required a
separate review process focused on national origin[,]" which used a lower
threshold requirement and more ambiguous wording in order to permit
greater inclusiveness in conducting reviews. 57 Secondly, the Byrd
Amendment, by requiring evaluation of the potential effects of a transac-
tion, "expanded the scope of national security factors for consideration,
laying the foundation for the consideration of third-party transactions. '58
Finally, the Byrd Amendment requires an immediate report to Congress
whether or not action is taken following an investigation, as well as a
Quadrennial Report detailing any credible evidence of either industrial
espionage or a coordinated attempt by either foreign countries or compa-
nies to usurp American control over leading sectors of technology. 59
In sum, the Byrd Amendment reflects Congress's attempt to
strengthen Exon-Florio and broaden its reach while bringing its utility to
the forefront of the President's toolbox in dealing with international busi-
ness transactions.
53. Id. app. § 2170(f).
54. Id. app. § 2170(g).
55. Id.
56. Fenton, supra note 43, at 206.
57. Id. at 207. Exon-Florio originally applied to transactions that "threaten[ed] to im-
pair the national security[;]" the Byrd Amendment changed this to the "could af-
fect the national security" standard. Id. Additionally,
the Department of Treasury not only made clear its intent to apply a
broad construction of the term "foreign government" to include "any
government or body exercising governmental function," but did not de-
fine when a corporation is "controlled by or acting on behalf of" a for-
eign government. The Department of Treasury was careful, however, to
emphasize Exon-Florio's application to supra-national entities, such as
the European Union.
Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
58. Id. This particular modification may have been substantially motivated by the
LTV-Thompson case, discussed infra. Id.
59. Id. at 209. This addition may have been Congress's attempt to apply greater politi-
cal pressure for more stringent enforcement of Exon-Florio by the President. Id.
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Several critical terms in Exon-Florio are not defined anywhere in the
statute. Most strikingly, "national security," which appears eight times in
the statute, was intentionally undefined because Congress intended "the
term 'to be interpreted broadly without limitation to a particular indus-
try."' 60 The 1988 Trade Act Conference Report recognized this omis-
sion,6 1 which, in effect, affords the President broad discretion and
flexibility in deciding where and when to apply Exon-Florio. Interest-
ingly, the Department of Treasury, which is responsible for Exon-Florio's
implementation, "rejected proposals that would have provided a clearer
definition of the term 'national security.' Instead, the Department of
Treasury purposely omitted any definition, citing congressional intent as
expressed in the Conference Report. '62
1. CFIUS
Under Exon-Florio, the President may appoint a designee to carry out
his responsibilities as enumerated under Exon-Florio. 63 On October 26,
1988, President Reagan delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the
power vested in the President under Exon-Florio "relative to mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers ... by or with foreign persons which could
result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate [commerce] in
the United States. '6 4 Additionally, President Reagan provided that
"[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with [CFIUS] . . . to take
such actions or make such recommendations as requested by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. '65
CFIUS, the primary vehicle through which Exon-Florio was imple-
mented, predates Exon-Florio and was created through an Executive Or-
der by President Ford in 1975.66 President Ford's Order designated the
Secretary of the Treasury as the head of CFIUS and stated that its pur-
pose was to "have primary continuing responsibility within the Executive
Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United
States. '67 Since 1975, membership of CFIUS has been expanded three
times, bringing its membership total to twelve.68 Today, the Department
60. Rosen, supra note 34, at 79.
61. Fenton, supra note 43, at 205 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 205-06 (citations omitted).
63. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
64. Interim Directive Regarding Disposition of Certain Mergers, Acquisitions, and
Takeovers, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,999 (Oct. 26, 1988).
65. Id.
66. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975).
67. Id. § 1(b).
68. Originally, CFIUS' membership was comprised of the Secretaries of State, the
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, the Assistant to the President for Economic Af-
fairs, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy.
Id. § 1(a). In 1980, President Carter modified President Ford's Executive Order by
replacing the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs with the United
States Trade Representative and the Executive Director of the Council on Interna-
tional Economic Policy with the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989, § 1-105(f) (Jan. 2, 1980). In 1988, Presi-
dent Reagan added the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Man-
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of the Treasury's official statement is that "CFIUS seeks to serve U.S.
investment policy through thorough reviews that protect national security
while maintaining the credibility of our open investment policy and pre-
serving the confidence of foreign investors here and of U.S. investors
abroad that they will not be subject to retaliatory discrimination. '69
2. CFIUS in Operation
In practice, CFIUS receives notice of proposed foreign acquisitions of
U.S. companies, distributes those notices to CFIUS member agencies,
and coordinates reviews. 70 After receiving a notice, CFIUS has thirty
days to decide whether to conduct a review.71 CFIUS must submit a re-
port to the President in the event that it undertakes and completes an
extended forty-five day review, referred to as an investigation.72 As pre-
scribed by Exon-Florio, the review process focuses on whether the pro-
posed transaction adversely affects national security. 73 Ordinarily, the
review process functions through a system of voluntary filings where for-
eign entities interested in purchasing American companies notify CFIUS
of this interest before the transaction is completed.74 By voluntarily sub-
mitting to review, foreign entities are able to obtain CFIUS clearance.
CFIUS clearance is analogous to a declaratory judgment because receiv-
ing clearance practically means that there is minimal risk that the Presi-
dent will order divestiture at a later date.75 A foreign entity is not
prejudiced for failure to notify, but in such cases, CFIUS members can
refer transactions that might affect national security to the review
process. 76
In spite of its apparently sweeping, inclusive power, Exon-Florio, as
implemented through CFIUS, has been applied only sparingly. In the
time between Exon-Florio's enactment in 1988 and 1999, CFIUS only in-
vestigated 17 out of approximately 1300 voluntary reports. 77 This statistic
is particularly shocking in view of the 1988 Trade Act Conference Report,
which specifically identified Exon-Florio's flexibility in order to afford
the President broad discretion and to encourage Exon-Florio's usage. 78
agement and Budget to CFIUS. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779, § 3-
201(F) (Dec. 27, 1988). In 1993, President Clinton added the Director of the Of-
fice of Science and Technology Policy, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. Exec.
Order No. 12,860, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,201 (Sept. 3, 1993). In 2003, President Bush
added the Secretary of Homeland Security to CFIUS. Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68
Fed. Reg. 10,619, § 57(a) (Feb. 28, 2003).




73. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170.
74. Fenton, supra note 43, at 209 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 209-10 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 205-06 (citations omitted).
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Of those seventeen investigations, seven transaction proposals were vol-
untarily withdrawn. 79 Out of the ten remaining cases, a President only
exercised his power to cancel a transaction under Exon-Florio one time:
President George H.W. Bush ordered the China National Aero-Technol-
ogy Import and Export Corporation to sell its interest in Mamco Manu-
facturing Inc. in 1990.80
Given its track record, some have declared that Exon-Florio is ineffec-
tive and nothing but "a paper dragon.18 1 These critics argue that CFIUS,
rather than concerning itself with national security, is more opportunistic
and only "interested in protecting inbound investment flows."' 82 Further-
more, CFIUS has carried out "its duties in a 'nonchalant' and 'cavalier'
fashion because of its focus upon specific transactions only, rather than
on the synergistic and cumulative effect that multiple transactions will
have on the [nation's] defense industrial base. '83
Other critics are concerned by Exon-Florio's failure to define its key
terms. 84 These opponents envision specific scenarios where Exon-Florio
could be applied abusively. In one case, for example, Exon-Florio "could
be utilized as a shield to protect domestic industry in the context of broad
and aggressive industrial policy."'8 5 Such an application would effectively
negate the United States' traditional free trade disposition by preferen-
tially protecting domestic industry while also reflecting an attempt to dis-
engage the United States from the forefront of the globalized world
economy. Exon-Florio could also be used as retribution in order to effec-
tuate change in trade practices abroad. 86 While these retaliatory abuses
79. Id. at 210.
80. Evelyn Iritani, Chinese Bid for Unocal Stirs Up Issues, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2005,
at C1. This case is somewhat anomalous because of its glaring national security
implications. Mamco Manufacturing Inc. produced metal components for Ameri-
can commercial aircraft. China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation, on the other hand, was owned by China's Ministry of Aerospace
Technology and was a close affiliate of the People's Liberation Army. Such a
transaction "risked providing China unique access to U.S. aerospace companies
and products restricted under export controls." Fenton, supra note 43, at 210 (cita-
tions omitted).
81. Rosen, supra note 34, at 81.
82. Id.
83. Id. Considering the nature of today's globalized economy, it makes sense that "the
only appropriate focus is to examine all of the reasonably foreseeable effects of an
FDI transaction." Id. at 82.
84. One critic even concluded that "the 'vague parameters and elastic provisions cre-
ate a potent protectionist weapon that virtually invites abuse."' Fenton, supra
note 43, at 211 (citation omitted).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 212. Exon-Florio "could be deployed to open foreign markets or remedy
anti-competitive behavior where a foreign investor's home state engages in unfair
trade practices, or maintains an atmosphere unfavorable to American investors.
Exon-Florio could also be utilized as a retaliatory instrument designed to remedy
unfair practices perpetrated by the [foreign] company." Id. at 212. Curiously,
members of the House Armed Services Committee panel participating in the hear-
ing on the CNOOC-Unocal deal made similar complaints about the unfair trade
practices and lack of reciprocal openness in the Chinese economy. See infra notes
176, 179.
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are not in the spirit of traditional American economic cooperation and
openness, it is important to bear in mind that the express purpose of
Exon-Florio is to protect national security, and, as such, a minimal con-
traction of our liberalized economy to effectuate that purpose is perhaps
an acceptable casualty in the era of globalization.
Technical criticisms regarding Exon-Florio have also circulated. Within
Exon-Florio's legal framework, for example, there appears to be some
reticence regarding initiation of the review process because of the correct,
yet dangerous, "assumption that existing emergency laws can be effec-
tively used to" meet Exon-Florio's objectives. 87 Some commentators
have also complained about the President's delinquency in satisfying
Exon-Florio's requirement for a quadrennial report,88 which may shed
light on the reasons why Presidents have used Exon-Florio sparingly. Fi-
nally, and quite importantly, many critics have argued that serious flaws
exist in Exon-Florio because it fails to provide CFIUS with the trans-
parency necessary for effective oversight.89 Because reports are only gen-
erated when a presidential decision regarding a transaction is involved,
only two such reports have ever been sent to Congress since 1997.90 In
order to have effective oversight, CFIUS review process must become
more transparent and more accountable.
3. Are Exon-Florio and CFIUS Worthwhile?
Given that only one divestiture has taken place in the era of Exon-
Florio and that the official records detailing CFIUS' activities have been
sparse, it is difficult to assess the actual benefits of Exon-Florio. On the
other hand, it should be noted that CFIUS' impact on national security is
practically impossible to question because many foreign entities withdraw
their transaction proposals before formal review commences or the mat-
ter is referred to the President for a decision. 91 Thus, it can be argued
that "Exon-Florio's value lies in its function as a deterrent and the oppor-
tunity created by the review process for the federal government to
restructure a transaction. ' 92 In this respect, the influence of the review
process as a deterrent is powerful, yet subtle. In response to criticism of
87. Rosen, supra note 34, at 82.
88. "After a first report was delivered in 1993, the Executive has neglected to fulfill its
legal requirement, and the last report is 9 years overdue." National Security Impli-
cations of the Possible Merger between the China National Offshore Oil Corpora-
tions with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs.,
109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of Hon. C. Richard D'Amato, Chairman, U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission on House Armed Services)
[hereinafter D'Amato].
89. Id. at 6.
90. A Review of the CFIUS Process for Implementing the Exon-Florio Amendments:
Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 2(2005) (statement of Katherine Schinasi, Managing Director, Acquisition and
Sourcing Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
91. Fenton, supra note 43, at 213 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 212-13 (citation omitted).
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CFIUS' meager track record as evidence of its ineffectiveness, the Trea-
sury Department has said:
CFIUS' impact goes far beyond sample statistics. CFIUS enhances
the national security when it identifies specific problems which could
threaten U.S. security and helps resolve these problems while still
allowing U.S. business[es] to received [sic] the capital they need.
Blocking a transaction is a crude tool and serves no purpose when
more subtle remedies are available ... Viewed from this perspective,
CFIUS has been very successful. 93
Assuming the accuracy of this statement, Exon-Florio and CFIUS have
been effective players in the protection of American national security.
Given that out of 1300 voluntary submissions between 1988 and 1999,
only 17 required CFIUS to conduct an investigation, 94 one can assume
that the remaining 1283 transactions were either safe enough to proceed
or were voluntarily withdrawn. In either case, it appears that the national
security was protected.
But of the seventeen cases that CFIUS did review, only ten went to the
President, and the President only blocked one transaction.9 5 As a result,
the remaining nine cases were questionable enough to require CFIUS
review (a very serious process), but not so dubious as to motivate the
purchasing company to withdraw or the President to block the transac-
tion. While it is impossible to know the specific nature of the CFIUS
review in those nine cases, this aspect of the statistical mixture raises spe-
cific issues about Exon-Florio's quality because of the broad discretion it
affords the President. Insulated from judicial review, the President is
able-as exemplified by these nine instances-to approve a transaction
that CFIUS had decided to be uncertain enough to require investigation.
Without specific statutory controls and requirements, as those that exist
in various industries, the President is able to trump a CFIUS investigation
and make his own determination.
B. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS
1. Airlines
The airline industry in the United States is a strategic asset because of
the potential national security implications of dangerous or intentionally
destructive airplane flights, which was tragically reinforced by the events
of September 11, 2001. The airline industry also garners significant pro-
tection because the airline industry is a symbolic national asset.96 Ac-
cordingly, foreign involvement in the American airline industry is subject
to stringent regulation that began in its current form with the Federal
93. Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Consider, for example, the fact that airline names frequently echo patriotic or geo-
graphical themes, such as American Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, and
Alaska Airlines.
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Aviation Act of 1958 (Aviation Act). 97 Under the Aviation Act, only
U.S. citizens 98 may offer domestic air service within the United States.99
More specifically, "[d]omestic airline operations are limited to aircraft
registered in the United States, for which only a U.S. citizen or a corpora-
tion organized in the United States with aircraft based and used primarily
in the United States may register."'' Foreign carriers may navigate in
the United States only if several statutory conditions are met. 10 1
2. Farmland
Historically, American farmland has also been the subject of legislative
protectionism because of the perceived symbolic and strategic value of
land. In fact, by 1979, "[f]oreign ownership of farmland ha[d] been re-
stricted in 20 states, and... the U.S. Congress [had] approved legislation
that would require foreign investors to report all purchases or long-term
leases of American farmland to the Secretary of Agriculture.' 10 2 Ameri-
can attention to the perceived problem of foreign ownership of farmland
was not a new concern in 1979. As was the case in other industries, 10 3 the
perceived strategic and symbolic value of American farmland began
much earlier-in 1887 with the Alien Land Act.'0 4 In 1979, however, it
was reported that the objections to foreign ownership of U.S. farmland
were largely unfounded and emotional. 10 5 In fact, foreign ownership at
the time accounted for only less than 1 percent of total U.S. farmland
ownership.'0 6 Furthermore, it was reported in 1979 that the impact of
foreign ownership on farming operations was minimal and that foreign
investment increased U.S. wealth and the foreign exchange value of the
dollar. 10 7 Eventually, as has happened in other instances where the
97. Other prior legislation-the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938-had different limits and restrictions on the airline industry. See, e.g.,
Christopher Furlan, Foreign Ownership and Control Restrictions in United States
Airlines: Barrier to Mergers and Restructurings (Apr. 25, 2005) (unpublished com-
ment, on file with the Law & Business Review of the Americas).
98. An airline counts as an American citizen if 75 percent of the airline's voting inter-
est is owned or controlled by U.S. citizens. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (1997 &
Supp. 2006).
99. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (1997).
100. Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment and
Operations: How Much is Enough?, 9 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 417, 445 (1994)
(citations omitted).
101. The most notable conditions include reciprocal licensing of U.S. aircraft in the
country of registry, a finding that the authorization is in the public interest, and a
finding that the authorization is consistent with international agreements. 49
U.S.C.A. § 41703 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
102. Clifton B. Luttrell, The "Danger" from Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland, FED.
RES. BANK OF ST. Louis, Jan. 1979, at 2.
103. See discussion of airline industry, supra Part B1, and the telecommunications and
defense industries, infra Part B3.
104. The Alien Land Act of 1887 was enacted in response to "the fear that American
farmers would become servants of distant masters uncomprehending the rights and
needs of Americans."' Luttrell, supra note 102, at 3 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8.
2007] FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF U.S. STRATEGIC ASSETS 397
threat of foreign investment was purely symbolic, concerns over foreign
ownership of U.S. farmland subsided.10 8
3. Telecommunications
Foreign investment and involvement in the telecommunications indus-
try is also specifically controlled by statute. This regulation began with
the Communications Act of 1934, which established numerical caps for
foreign ownership in the telecommunications industry.10 9 The Communi-
cations Act of 1934 was superseded by the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (1996 Act), which "removed some of the restrictions on foreign
ownership, but [retained] the old specter of fear" of foreign involvement
in American media. 110 In particular, the 1996 Act prescribes that:
No broadcast or common carrier ... license shall be granted to or held
by-
(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign
government;
(3) any corporation of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock
is owned of record or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a
foreign government or representative thereof or by any corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other cor-
poration of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned
of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign
government or representative thereof, or by any corporation organ-
ized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that
the public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such
license.1 11
The 1996 Act's categorical prohibition against foreign ownership and
strict regulation of corporate involvement reflects "the intent of Congress
to inject a national security consideration into the international telecom-
108. Japanese ownership of American real estate was once a concern in the United
States. In 1988, for example, Japanese investors had purchased $16.5 billion in
U.S. real estate. Arnold L. Redman & N.S. Gullett, An Empirical Study of the
Impact of Foreign Ownership on the Values of U.S. Commercial Properties,, 11 J.
FIN. & STRATEGIC DECISIONS 53 (1998). In 1989, Mitsubishi, a Japanese corpora-
tion, purchased a controlling interest in Rockefeller Center in New York City. At
the time, Japanese investors also owned significant other properties in the United
States, including half the office space in Los Angeles, California. Charles Bremner
& Joe Joseph, Japanese Money Muscles in on Manhattan Skyline, TIMES (U.K.),
Nov. 1, 1989. By 1995, Japan had lost control of Rockefeller Center and several
other notable U.S. properties, and Japanese investors lost a considerable amount
of money in the process. See, e.g., Beth Belton, Rockefeller Center: Japan's Lost
'Trophy', USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 1995, at 1A.
109. See Kathleen A. Lacey et al., International Telecommunications Mergers: U.S. Na-
tional Security Threats Inherent in Foreign Government Ownership of Controlling
Interests, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 41 (2002).
110. Id. at 44.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1996).
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munication business transaction."' 12 While Congress has provided broad
discretion to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (similar to
the flexibility provided to the President by Exon-Florio) to allow some
foreign involvement (unless the FCC finds that the public interest will be
served by refusing to allow that involvement), the 1996 Act is highly par-
ticularized and structured. Rather than providing factors to consider as
in Exon-Florio, the 1996 Act flatly prohibits foreign nationals and foreign
companies from participating in certain categories of the American tele-
communications industry. Given the traditionally liberalized disposition
of the American economy and the increasingly globalized world in which
we live, it has been argued that these restrictions are anachronistic,
counterproductive, and hypocritical. 113 In spite of the restrictiveness of
these requirements, Congress has felt that it was necessary to maintain
them in order to continue "[tihe FCC's delegated responsibility to foster
a robust forum for national debate[, which is] . . . essential to the vibrancy
of our deliberative democracy. 114
a. 1996 Act in Action: Rupert Murdoch and Fox News
Notwithstanding the rigidity of the 1996 Act, specific cases have shown
that the FCC has broad discretion in applying its regulations. Media mo-
gul Rupert Murdoch, the Chairman and Managing Director of News
Corp., an Australian company and parent of Twentieth Century Holdings
(the parent of conservative news outlet Fox) was the subject of FCC regu-
latory scrutiny in the 1990S.115 In 1985, Murdoch's purchase of Me-
tromedia's television stations in the United States required him to
become a naturalized American citizen because of FCC rules.11 6 In 1995,
the NAACP and, for a time, NBC, asked the FCC to investigate the issue
of Murdoch's citizenship to determine whether Murdoch was the legal
owner of his Fox news stations in the United States or whether Australia-
based News Corp. controlled the Fox stations. 117 That same year, the
FCC found no problems with Murdoch's ownership of telecommunica-
tions holdings in the United States,118 despite the fact that News Corp.
112. Lacey et al., supra note 109, at 45.
113. Id. at 44-45.
114. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3rd Cir. 2004); see Lacey et
al., supra, note 109, at 44-45.
115. Wikipedia: Rupert Murdoch, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert-Murdoch (last
visited Mar. 20, 2006).
116. At the time, "many felt that he received inordinately preferential treatment by the
Reagan administration in expediting the citizenship process." Museum of Broad-
cast Communications: Rupert K. Murdoch, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/
htmlM/murdochrupe/murdochrupe.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
117. Id.
118. Gloria Tristani, Comm'r FCC, Dissenting Statement: Transfer of Control of Broad-
cast Licenses Held by Subsidiaries of Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., to Fox Television
Stations, Inc. (July 24, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Tristani/
Statements/2001/stgtl49.html, 2001 WL 838739.
News Corp ... should be permitted ... to own U.S. television stations
because: (1)Rupert Murdoch himself was an American citizen and
would, through Fox Television (FTS), his majority-owned company, con-
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owned more than 99 percent of Twentieth Century Holdings.u 9 Further-
more, the FCC found that it would not be in the public interest for Fox to
alter its ownership structure to comply with 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).120 The
ability of the FCC to exercise tremendous flexibility in allowing Mur-
doch's continued ownership demonstrates the robust practicality of the
1996 Act, which, while providing apparently flat prohibitions against cer-
tain types of ownership, allows the FCC to make decisions with the public
interest in mind.
b. In re Global Crossing
In addition to FCC regulation, CFIUS has also been involved in inves-
tigating telecommunications transactions. In a case involving a bankrupt
American broadcast corporation, a court gave consideration to the fact
that CFIUS had not yet given the necessary approval for two foreign cor-
porations-one Chinese and one Singaporean-to purchase the Ameri-
can corporation. 21 In describing one of the purchasers, Hutchinson, the
court said that "Hutchinson is a Hong Kong entity, and Hong Kong is
now under the political control of ... China, [which] plainly ma[kes] se-
curing approval from CFIUS, which focuses in significant part on national
security concerns, difficult or impossible. 1 22 In contrast, the court opti-
mistically reported that Singapore Technologies Telemedia (STT), which
is owned and controlled by Singapore, might have had a better chance
with CFIUS because Singapore and the United States have "quite a good
relationship, and the natural security concerns, if any" will be settled by
CFIUS.123 As is the case in many similar transactions, and as discussed
trol the stations; and (2) because the tax consequences of not allowing
News Corp to own the stations would be significant.
Id.
119. Press Release, FCC, FCC Allows Fox Television to Retain Ownership Structure;
Renewal of WNYW-TV, New York City, Granted (July 28, 1995), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass Media/NewsReleases/nrmm5086.txt. News
Corp's ownership interest clearly exceeded the 25 percent statutory benchmark
prescribed by 47 U.S.C. § 310(b). "At that time the Commission conditionally
granted FTS a renewal of the WNYW-TV license and gave FTS two options: (1) to
bring its ownership structure into compliance with the benchmark; or (2) to
demonstrate why its ownership structure served the public interest." Id.
120. Id.
The FCC has allowed Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("FS'S") to retain its
current ownership structure, finding that it would not serve the public
interest to require FTS to restructure in order to comply with the 25
percent foreign ownership benchmark established in Section 310(b) of
the Communications Act. The Commission therefore removed a previ-
ously imposed condition on the renewal of FTS's license to operate sta-
tion WNYW-TV, New York, NY, and said that FrS, as presently
structured, may acquire additional broadcast stations, up to the allowable
maximum set forth in the ownership rules.
Id.
121. In fact, the court considered CFIUS and FCC review to be the most significant
regulatory reviews facing this proposed transaction. In re Global Crossing Ltd.,
295 B.R. 726, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
122. Id. at 732.
123. Id.
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below vis-A-vis CFIUS' track record, takeovers that appear to present sig-
nificant challenges oftentimes force the questionable purchaser out of the
deal. In In re Global Crossing, for example, "the Board was aware that
CFIUS approval ... would be very difficult so long as Hutchinson was
one of the Investors[.] ... [Eventually,] Hutchinson . . . indicated that it
would withdraw from the Purchase Agreement, and that STT would step
into its place.' 1 24 In this respect, CFIUS' power to deter succeeded, and,
consequently, no presidential intervention was necessary to protect na-
tional security.
4. Defense
The defense industry includes an array of resources considered to be
strategic assets because of the significant power-in both actual force and
symbolism-that these particular assets hold. In many respects, a coun-
try's military might is both its first line and its last line of defense in en-
suring national security. By acting as a symbolic force, the preeminence
of the American military is able to deter invasion and attacks from
weaker entities. Because the American military has access to and con-
trols some of the most powerful and advanced weaponry, it is available to
defend the nation in the event of armed conflict. If adverse foreign cor-
porations are able to purchase American defense contractors, those for-
eign corporations would potentially have access to sensitive information
in glaring violation of our national security interests.
Consequently, Congress has acted to restrict transactions involving de-
fense contractors that would affect our national security. For example, as
discussed earlier, Exon-Florio itself appeared as an amendment to the
Defense Production Act of 1950 and was used by President George H.W.
Bush in 1990 to prevent a Chinese company from owning an interest in an
American aerospace company.125 Additionally, the Defense Industrial
Security Program has expounded "indirect restrictions on foreign invest-
ment in the U.S. defense industry through limits on access to sensitive
government projects. ' 126 If an acquired company loses its previously-
held security clearance because of its foreign acquisition, then the acquisi-
tion may be "untenable and force divestment. '127 This indirect approach
has been quite successful in preventing foreign acquisitions because for-
eign companies "generally have difficulty obtaining the security clearance
necessary.' 28 In the event that a U.S. company is subject to foreign own-
ership, control, or investment and an acquisition is allowed to proceed,
the U.S. company's "board .. .may be required to issue a resolution
certifying that the foreign interests will have no access to the classified
information.' 29
124. Id. at 735.
125. See supra Section III.B.1.
126. Corr, supra note 100, at 435.
127. Id. at 436.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 438.
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Restrictions on defense-related transactions have been applied even if
the purchasing company's country of origin is friendly to the United
States because of concern that the purchasing company, through its deal-
ings with third parties in adverse nations, will pursue third party transac-
tions that will negatively impact the U.S.' national security. In 1992,
Thomson, a corporation entirely owned by the French government, of-
fered to buy the Missile Division of LTV Aerospace & Defense
(LTVAD). LTVAD manufactured military and commercial aerospace
and other defense products primarily for the U.S. government.' 30 With
the intent to buy LTVAD, Thomson formed a Delaware-based subsidiary
for the primary purpose of purchasing the missile division. 131 At the
time, however, "as much as 70% of the Missiles Division's revenues came
from [government] contracts requiring access to classified informa-
tion. ' 132 This requirement presented a major obstacle to the transaction,
even though Thomson could have "minimize[d] the effect of [foreign
ownership, control, or investment]... through a Special Security Agree-
ment (SSA)."'1 33
Like Hutchinson, the transaction underwent the CFIUS review process
in order to determine that the link between LTV's government contracts
and French ownership under Thomson would not compromise national
security. 134 As part of its review process, "CFIUS submitted question-
naires to be answered by Thomson and LTV concerning the security im-
plications of the acquisition."'135 Thomson failed to obtain an SSA, and,
subsequently, also failed to satisfy the Department of Defense's request
that it proceed with a proxy agreement or voting trust.136 Consequently,
Thomson was forced to withdraw its application from CFIUS, and the
matter never reached the President for his approval. 137 Like other trans-
actions practically doomed from the start, the Thomson-LTV deal col-
lapsed because the risks of having a French-owned company supply the
U.S. military were too great, particularly with respect to the potential for
third party transactions and exportations.138
C. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONs ABROAD
The restrictions the United States places on foreign ownership are not
unique among other developed nations. Like the United States, the Eu-
130. In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
131. Id. at 850.
132. Id. at 851.
133. Id. ("Under regulations promulgated by the [Department of Defense], every com-
pany performing work on government contracts must receive Facility Security
clearance. To obtain such clearance, foreign-owned companies such as Thomson
are required to take steps to insulate foreign ownership, control or influence").
134. Id. at 853.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 854.
138. Id. Even though the bankruptcy court approved the purchase of the LTV by an-
other company, Thomson appealed, arguing, inter alia, that LTV had "failed to
provide it adequate assistance in obtaining" CFIUS approval. Id. at 857.
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ropean Union and Japan require majority domestic ownership in the air-
line and telecommunications industries, respectively. 139 The bulk of
global FDI restrictions are actually in non-manufacturing sectors, with
"electricity, transport and telecommunications [being] the most con-
strained industries, followed by finance.' 140 Iceland has a complete ban
of foreign ownership in its fishing and energy industries, while Mexico
has similar restrictions in its oil sector. 141 In fact, the United States is
below average in terms of FDI restrictions when compared to other de-
veloped nations. 142
Many other English-speaking nations appear to have greater restric-
tions on FDI than the United States.143 It is noteworthy, however, that
there has been a substantial liberalization of FDI in most developed
countries since 1980.144 Australia, for example, "maintains restrictions on
investment in sensitive sectors, including urban land, banking, aviation,
airports, shipping, broadcasting, newspapers and telecommunications.' 145
In telecommunications, in particular, Australia has enacted specific legis-
lation limiting the total foreign ownership of its dominant carrier.' 46 Fur-
thermore, Australian law requires that the chairman and a majority of the
board of directors of the dominant carrier must be Australian citizens. 147
Among telecommunications sectors in English-speaking nations, Austra-
lia's restrictions are the most stringent. 148
139. Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in OECD Countries, OECD ECON. OUT-
LOOK No. 73, June 2003, ch. 7, at 2, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/
35/2956455.pdf [hereinafter FDI].
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 4. "The countries with the highest levels of overall restrictions are Iceland,
Canada, Turkey, Mexico, Australia, Austria, Korea and Japan. The United States
is slightly below the OECD mean." Id.
143. Id. at 5. According to the OECD, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia have more
restrictions on FDI than the United States. Contrastingly, the United Kingdom
has fewer such restrictions. Id.
144. Id. at 6. The United States and Japan are exceptions to the liberalizing trend. Id.
145. Jeffrey Robertson, Foreign Ownership in the Telecommunications Sector, RE-
SEARCH NoTE No. 34 (AusTL.), Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/
RN/2004-05/05rn34.htm. "Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975,
the Treasurer makes the final decision and may prevent investment deemed to be
'contrary to the national interest."' Id.
146. Id. Foreign shareholding of Telstra, Australia's dominant telecommunications car-
rier, is limited by the Telstra Corporation Act 1991 to 35 percent of listed capital.
No foreign person or association may own more than 5 percent of listed share
capital. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. By comparison, Canada limits foreign ownership to 20 percent of voting shares
and requires 80 percent of the board of directors to be Canadian citizens. Telecom
New Zealand limits foreign ownership to 10 percent of voting shares without prior
approval. The United Kingdom and the United States have no legislation specifi-
cally restricting foreign ownership on a percentage basis. Id.
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IV. GLOBALIZATION, OIL, AND NATIONAL SECURITY AT A
CROSSROADS: CNOOC-UNOCAL
In late June 2005, CNOOC made an offer to purchase Unocal, an
American oil company, in an acquisition attempt CNOOC code-named
"Operation Treasure Ship."'1 49 To understand the American uproar
against the deal that began the day CNOOC made its offer, it is impor-
tant to first understand the would-be purchaser. 50 CNOOC was created
by the Chinese government "in 1982 to be a joint venture partner with
foreign oil companies exploring for offshore oil reserves. 1 51 CNOOC "is
considered to be one of the top 50 state-owned companies, a place of high
privilege in the Chinese government hierarchy."'1 52 Furthermore, Fu
Chengyu, CNOOC's Chief Executive Officer, is also the Communist
Party Leading Group's secretary, and "the purchase of Unocal was ap-
proved by the State Council, China's cabinet, and the governor of the
State Central Bank helped assemble the financial purchase package. '153
Though CNOOC was worth only $22 billion, it offered $18.5 billion to
acquire Unocal, a clear indicator of the extent of the Chinese govern-
ment's involvement in the deal.154
Prior to CNOOC's purchase offer, China had already made its interest
in purchasing American companies abundantly clear. In 2002, China
Netcom Communications Group purchased the Asian subsidiary of
Global Crossing, which was followed by the Lenovo Group's purchase of
IBM's personal computer division in December 2004.155 In 2005, the
Haier Group made an offer for Maytag Corporation.1 56 Prior to the pro-
posal, China had also made its foray in to the energy sector, with
CNOOC purchasing a 17 percent interest in Canada's MEG Energy and
Sinopec, another Chinese oil company, buying a 40 percent interest in the
Canadian oil sands project. 157 Curiously, CNOOC's board of directors
had trouble deciding whether to make a purchase offer, and it was not
until a shakeup in the board's membership took place that CNOOC for-
mally made its unsolicited offer. 158
149. David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy U.S.
Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al.
150. See id.
151. D'Amato, supra note 88, at 1.
152. Id. at 1-2.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id. at 2. According to D'Amato
the loan package for the acquisition is heavily subsidized. Seven billion
dollars came from CNOOC's parent, China National Offshore Oil. Of
that amount, $2.5 billion dollars is interest free, and the rest is a 30-year
loan at 3 percent [interest] .... Six billion more dollars came from a
State-owned bank."
Id.
155. Crawford & Young, supra note 33.
156. Iritani, supra note 80, at Cl.
157. Crawford & Young, supra note 33.
158. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 149, at Al. "[Wihen Unocal was up for auction,
[CNOOC's] independent directors voted against pursuing a bid during a heated
board meeting, just 15 hours before the bidding deadline." Id.
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A. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
On June 24, 2005, forty-one members of Congress from both parties
sent a letter urging a thorough CFIUS review of the deal to Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow. 159 Writing that the "[e]nergy security is a mat-
ter of significant and increasing importance for the US," these members
indicated that they were "very concerned about China's ongoing and pro-
posed acquisition of energy assets around the world, including those in
the US."1 60 On June 27, 2005, Joe Barton, the chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter to President Bush re-
minding him that "[t]he Chinese are great economic and political rivals,
not friendly competitors or allies in democracy."1 61 Clearly the stage was
being set for the drama that was to unfold.
1. House Resolution 344162
On June 29, 2005, Representative Richard Pombo of California's 11th
district introduced a bill in the House of Representatives expressing Con-
gress's national security concerns regarding the deal. 163 The bill was re-
ferred to both the House Committee on Financial Services and the
Committee on International Relations. 164 On June 30, 2005, the House
suspended the rules and the resolution passed without amendment by an
overwhelming vote of 398 to 15, with 20 representatives not voting. 165
First, the resolution recognizes that oil and natural gas are strategic
assets, the control of which is "critical to national security and the Na-
tion's economic prosperity. 1 66 In support, the bill cites statistics regard-
ing the world's current output of oil and natural gas, the increased world
consumption of these resources, and the importance of having control of
oil and natural gas in the 21st century. Regarding China, the bill men-
tions the fact that President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy con-
cluded that "China remains strongly committed to national one-party rule
by the Communist Party. 1 67 Finally, the resolution takes note of China's
increased oil consumption in recent years. 168
159. Iritani, supra note 80, at C1. In addition to congressional concern, approximately
73 percent of the American public opposed the merger in July 2005. David R.
Baker, The China Connection Lawmakers Lash Out at CNOOC's Unsolicited Bid
for Unocal, S.F. CHRON., July 14, 2005, at El.
160. John Chan, China's Bid for Unocal Heightens Tension with the US, WORLD SO-
CIALIST WEB SITE, July 6, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/chin-
j06.shtml.
161. Letter from Congressman Joe Barton, Rep. 6th Dist. TX, to George W. Bush, U.S.
President (June 27, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/
06282005_1577.htm.
162. The Senate produced a roughly similar version of this House Resolution. S. Res.
1412, 109th Cong. (2005).
163. H. R. Res. 344.
164. Id.
165. H.R. Doc. No. H5592 (2005) (bill status & summary).
166. H. R. Res. 344, at 1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Turning towards the deal itself and its national security implications,
the resolution first takes notice of the logistics of CNOOC and its offer.
For one thing, "China owns approximately 70 percent of CNOOC [and] a
significant portion of the CNOOC acquisition is to be financed and heav-
ily subsidized by banks owned by... China." 169 Additionally, the resolu-
tion declares that the transaction "would result in [Unocal's] strategic
assets ... being preferentially allocated to China by the Chinese govern-
ment," which would "weaken [U.S.] ability... to influence the oil and gas
supplies of the Nation through companies that must adhere to United
States laws.' 170 Consequently, CNOOC would have control of "approxi-
mately one-third of all global excess oil production," a disconcerting
thought considering that CNOOC never made any "commitment to sell
[the resources] it develops to global energy markets instead of shipping it
directly to China."1 71
The resolution also recognizes that not only would the CNOOC-Uno-
cal merger transfer significant natural resources away from the United
States and towards China, but it would also open the door for certain
dual-use technologies to be exported to China.172 The dangerous possi-
bility of these dual commercial/military use technologies falling into Chi-
nese hands is alarming given the tenuous nature of Sino-American
relations. Additionally, the bill also discusses the fact that Chinese oil
companies are "active in parts of the world, such as Sudan and Iran, that
are subject to United States sanctions laws."1 73 Consequently, "the na-
tional security of the United States [could be] threatened by the export of
sensitive, export controlled, and dual-use technologies to such
countries."174
Finally invoking Exon-Florio to underscore the President's authority in
this situation and to encourage him to act, the House of Representatives
resolved the following with respect to CNOOC's proposed take-over of
Unocal:
(1) the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corpora-
tion, through control of Unocal Corporation obtained by the pro-
posed acquisition, merger, or takeover of Unocal Corporation, could
take action that would threaten to impair the national security of the
United States; and
(2) if Unocal Corporation enters into an agreement of acquisition,
merger, or takeover of Unocal Corporation by the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation, the President should initiate immediately
a thorough review of the proposed acquisition, merger, or
takeover.1 75
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 2-3.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
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Needless to say, the Chinese government was highly critical of what it
perceived to be the U.S. government's interference in international
trade. 176 Demonstrating the contentious nature of the resolution and the
underlying transaction, House members shot back a reply reflecting the
complicated nature of the dilemma. 177
2. Armed Services Committee Hearings
In July 2005, the House Armed Services Committee began its own in-
vestigation into the Unocal-CNOOC deal by inviting commentators to
submit their opinion of the proposed take-over. 178 In his opening state-
ment, Chairman Duncan Hunter expressed his belief that "[tihe simple
fact is that energy is a strategic commodity" affecting national security
and that the Unocal-CNOOC deal would help China to increase "its lev-
erage over U.S. interests" in regions affected by the deal.179 Hunter also
considered the fact that "Chinese enterprises do not behave as normal
commercial companies on the international market. '180 Accordingly,
since the Chairman of CNOOC, Fu Chengyu, is also the Secretary of the
Communist Party's Leading Group, Chairman Hunter believed that the
deal would pave the way for the Communist Party to use increased en-
ergy resources to serve its whimsical wishes to the disadvantage of the
United States.1 81
The commentators' submissions during the Armed Services Committee
hearings on the Unocal-CNOOC deal included arguments both in sup-
port and against the take-over. The arguments in defense of the transac-
tion tended to lose sight of the broader national security and symbolic
176. National Security Implications of the Possible Merger Between the China National
Offshore Oil Corporations with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Duncan Hunter, Chairman,
House Armed Services Committee). The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the fol-
lowing statement: "We demand that the U.S. Congress correct its mistaken ways of
politicizing economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commer-
cial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries." Id.
177. Id. at 1. Chairman Hunter of the Armed Services Committee said the following in
reply to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's statement:
With all due respect to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, it's not a normal
commercial exchange when one of the parties to a deal is owned and
operated by a totalitarian communist government that does not answer
to the rules of the market .... Even when we [Committee members]
disagree with one another, we answer to the American people, not the





181. Id. Chairman Hunter said the following,
The chairman of the Chinese company, Fu Chengyu, also happens to be
the secretary of the leading group of the Communist Party. Can anyone
honestly believe that his primary interest lies in protecting the interest of
his shareholders and the stability of global energy markets? Of course
not. He answers to the politburo in Beijing.
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implications of CNOOC's purchase of Unocal. 182 For example, Jerry
Taylor of the Cato Institute virtually guaranteed that America will have
sufficient oil supply in the future regardless of whether the deal pro-
ceeds. 183 In support, Taylor wrote that "there are plenty of sellers in
world oil markets," and since "Unocal's reserves are not large enough to
provide CNOOC with significant market power in the global oil econ-
omy" and "China is a net oil importer," America need not worry about
access to oil.184 Taylor concluded by saying that the transaction will not
provide China with an "[o]il [wleapon," and that "[t]here is no reason to
worry about the impact that a merger between CNOOC and Unocal
might have on domestic energy prices or America's access to oil. ' '18 5
As demonstrated in other submissions to the House Armed Services
Committee, however, the concern over the Unocal-CNOOC merger was
not merely about the United States' future access to oil, though such anx-
iety is not unfounded. Rather, American concern was also rooted in the
unnerving notion that Communist China would control an American cor-
poration that dealt primarily in a strategic nature resource. As Frank J.
Gaffney, Jr., the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for
Security Policy, pointed out, the United States should not allow this trans-
action to proceed for three reasons:
1) The folly of abetting Communist China's effort to acquire more of
the world's relatively finite energy resources. 2) The contribution
this purchase would make to [China's] efforts to dominate the vital
supply of rare earth minerals. And 3) the larger and ominous Chi-
nese strategic plan of which this purchase is emblematic.1 8 6
Gaffney believes that "China is mindful of the lessons of the 20th cen-
tury with respect to energy insecurity. Imperial Japan's thirst for im-
ported oil was a principal catalyst for its war with the United States. '187
Rather than follow in Japan's footsteps, however, China "is engaged in an
even-more-ambitious effort to acquire legal title to energy resources."'188
Honorable C. Richard D'Amato, the Chairman of the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, also expressed concern regard-
ing China's broader strategic plan in his submission to the House Armed
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. National Security Implications of the Possible Merger Between the China National
Offshore Oil Corporations with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Jerry Taylor, Director, Natu-
ral Resources Studies, Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/
ct-jt071305.html.
185. Id.
186. National Security Implications of the Possible Merger Between the China National
Offshore Oil Corporations with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Presi-
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Services Committee. 189 In particular, D'Amato takes note of the fact
that "Unocal holds reserves extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the
Caspian region to Southeast Asia, as well as in Africa, Europe, and South
America."1 90 As a result of this take-over, "Chinese political influence in
[these] regions [will be introduced or increase,] displacing the influence of
an American company with American standards." 191
D'Amato also raised several interesting issues regarding Chinese oil
companies' behavior and role in world politics. For example, Sinopec has
purchased a 50 percent stake in a major Iranian oil field and has "signed a
$70 billion deal to buy Iranian oil and gas over the next three decades. ' 192
Alarmingly "[a]s a quid pro quo, China [intentionally] complicates inter-
national pressure on Iran regarding nuclear weapons development, and
has given Iran advanced missile technology.' 1 93 Additionally, China has
arranged for other deals with Sudan and Venezuela, countries whose in-
terests are decidedly adverse to those of the United States.194 It appears
that the transaction with Unocal at issue would be another in a long line
of China's mercantilistic sweep of world oil resources that would leave
America in the dust.
B. CNOOC-UNOCAL AND PRESIDENTIAL INACTION
Despite Congress's hearty involvement in attempting to block
CNOOC's purchase offer, the Bush administration said relatively little
about the deal, apart from urging the review process to be conducted in a
fair and transparent manner. 195 Notwithstanding the tools at his disposal,
President Bush followed his predecessors and reaffirmed a presidential
predilection to refrain from referring proposed purchases of U.S. strate-
gic assets for CFIUS review. In this particular instance, the White
House's reticence is understandable at first blush given the tenuous na-
ture of Sino-American relations; President Bush's inaction likely reflects
the administration's recognition of the importance of maintaining and at-
tempting to improve relations with China. 196 Regardless, the President's
lack of involvement left Congress a wide-open field to consider the impli-
cations of the deal and the way in which the United States should handle
the offer.' 97  As discussed, the congressional response reflected
America's uneasiness with such a takeover.
189. D'Amato, supra note 88, at 3.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 3.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id. D'Amato writes that China purchases 50 percent of Sudan's oil exports in
exchange for votes against UN Security Council action against Sudan's genocidal
practices. Additionally, China plans to develop fifteen oil fields and buy 1.44 bil-
lion barrels of oil per year from Venezuela. Id.
195. Iritani, supra note 80, at C1.
196. Id.
197. Jad Mouawad, Congress Calls for a Review of the Chinese Bid for Unocal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at C3.
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C. THE WORLD AFTER CNOOC-UNOCAL
On August 2, 2005, CNOOC indicated that it would withdraw its offer
for Unocal. 198 Surprisingly, CNOOC's failure to acquire Unocal did not
appear to deter its prospects in its drive to acquire greater control of the
world's oil and other fossil fuel assets. In fact, days after CNOOC
dropped its bid for Unocal, oil industry analysts were already suggesting
that CNOOC would continue "an aggressive international search for oil
and gas supplies."' 99 To support China's increased energy needs and its
growing economy, these analysts suggested that CNOOC look for oppor-
tunities with fewer political implications.2 00 With strong political support
and ready access to so-called cheap money, CNOOC should have little
problem in its quest to quench the growing oil thirst of the Chinese
economy. 20 1
China's oil aspirations aside, the fallout from Congress's involvement
in the failure of CNOOC's bid raises concerns for similar American trans-
actions abroad. Though China attempted to downplay the effect of its
defeat on Sino-American relations,2 02 any retribution abroad is not out of
the question. Whether in future trade dealings with China or other na-
tions, the United States should anticipate similar treatment from foreign
governments when dealing with strategic assets. The reality is that the
potential for foreign government interference is arguably greater after
CNOOC-Unocal, 20 3 especially since the United States has been a vocal
198. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 149, at A6. American oil company Chevron ulti-
mately merged with UNOCAL. Hil Anderson, Unocal Votes to Accept Chevron
Offer, PLATT'S OILGRAM PRICE REP., Aug. 11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
13372129.
199. David Lague, Aggressive Search by Cnooc for New Oil and Gas Seen, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2005, at C4.
200. Id.
201. Id. Even though analysts agree that another opportunity as lucrative as Unocal is
not likely to come to CNOOC any time soon, they suggest that CNOOC turn its
sights to two targets: Woodside Petroleum, located in Australia, and the Gorgon
natural gas development, which, ironically, is led by Chevron. As an indicator that
problems still remain, the Australian government rejected a 2001 takeover bid
from Shell Oil Company "because it would have given a foreign company control
over the extraction and marketing of a major Australian energy resource." Id.
Evidently, the United States is not the only country that feels the need to act pro-
tectively against the Chinese. Id.
202. Keith Bradsher, China Plays Down Bid's Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, at C4.
Though the Chinese foreign ministry in June 2005 said, "[w]e demand that the U.S.
Congress correct its mistaken ways of politicizing trade and economic issues and
stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the
two countries," two months later, in August 2005, the ministry said, "[e]conomic
and trade cooperation between companies from China and the United States are
to the benefit of both sides... [CNOOC's] bid to merge with Unocal was a normal
commercial activity between companies." Id.
203. Mouawad, Congress Calls for a Review of the Chinese Bid for Unocal, supra note
197, at C3. As Senator Byron L. Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat said, "[d]o
you think that Unocal could buy [CNOOC]? Not in a million years. The Chinese
government would not allow that." Id.
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critic of attempts abroad to inhibit foreign investment.20 4 Although only
time can tell what the exact foreign reception will be, it appears that the
outlook is not particularly bright.205
American investors' ability to invest in China and vise-versa is also
cause for concern after CNOOC-Unocal. 20 6 Chinese investors will likely
be deterred from continuing to invest in the United States because of
perceived bias and government meddling in the United States. Con-
versely, American investment in China may also be impacted. FDI in
China was far from uncomplicated before CNOOC made its proposal.
For one thing, China's legal system is not adequately sophisticated "to
sustain growth and bolster the confidence of ... foreign investors[,] ' '20 7
and China flatly denies foreign ownership of Chinese companies, particu-
larly in the energy sector.208 While the CNOOC-Unocal debacle cannot
be expected to make this policy any better, it would be duplicitous and
imprudent for China to place further restrictions on American
investments.
Whatever the outcome abroad, events since CNOOC withdrew its bid
show that many of Congress's concerns were not unfounded. CNOOC
will continue its aggressive search for oil in parts of the world the United
States considers dangerous and controlled by governments or other enti-
ties aligned with terrorists. Notwithstanding the analysts' suggestion that
CNOOC pursue opportunities in Australia, for example, the Chinese oil
204. "[T]he US Trade Representative has frequently stated that the system of corporate
control in Japan has hampered investment by US companies and that regulatory
practices in telecommunications in the European Union act as de facto FDI re-
straining measure." FDI, supra note 139, at 3. "Until the recent passage of the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), the United States re-
mained opposed to Australia's continued use of the FIRB [Foreign Investment
Review Board] screening process and what it termed a 'relatively broad national
interest test."' Robertson, supra note 145.
205. Jad Mouawad, Foiled Bid Stirs Worry for U.S. Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at
Cl. In August 2005, for example, David L. Goldwyn, a former assistant secretary
of energy under President Clinton, said, "[w]hat this misguided policy did was to
say the United States will not advocate fair trade when it comes to American as-
sets ... [and its behavior is] a little hypocritical." Id. Those involved in the indus-
try also had similar concerns. The CEO of Exxon Mobil, Lee R. Raymond, said
early in the takeover war that Congress would be making a "big mistake" to get
involved because such action might incite retribution from foreign governments on
American companies abroad. Id.
206. Unocal Won't Be The Last, So Set the Rules Now, BUSINESSWEEK, July 11, 2005, at
96, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_28/b3942130.
htm. During the height of controversy surrounding the merger proposal, China
had "allowed $48 billion in direct investment by U.S. companies and ha[d] kept
U.S. interest rates low thanks to more than $200 billion in Treasury Depart[ment]
debt that it ha[d] amassed in its currency reserves." Id.
207. Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A
Comparative Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 269 (1996). This is due, in
large part, to the opposition in China to codification of contract and business law.
Id.
208. Lou Dobbs, Red Storm Ahead, CNN.coM, July 15, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
US/07/15/unocal.china/.
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company has continued its foray into the third world.20 9 Its most recent
deals aside, "CNOOC ... has spent nearly $2 billion over the last few
years acquiring overseas oil and gas exploration assets in countries like
Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh and Azerbaijan. ' '2 10
Had the CNOOC-Unocal merger been consummated, CNOOC outposts
in those areas of the world would potentially have had access to sensitive
Unocal technologies.
The United States, for its part, has continued to the beat of the same
protectionist drum. Dubai Ports World (DP World), a United Arab
Emirates/Dubai government-owned ports operator, recently paid $6.8 bil-
lion to purchase P&O, a ports operator based in the United Kingdom, in
late 2005.211 While this transaction may on its surface appear to be
outside of American jurisdiction, the catch is that the transaction in-
cluded ports P&O controlled in the United States.212 Early clamoring in
the United States over the national security implications of DP World's
control of the American ports was reminiscent of the response to
CNOOC's bid to purchase Unocal. 213 Though there are many differences
between the two deals,214 congressional reaction was predictable, given
the experience with CNOOC. 215 DP World ultimately consented to a
forty-five day review of the deal, but overwhelmingly negative political
pressure in the United States forced DP World to agree to sell off the
U.S.-based interests it had acquired from P&O.216 Yet again, congres-
sional interference managed to scuttle an international merger
agreement.
209. David Barboza, Chinese Energy Giant to Buy Stake in Nigerian Oil Field, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at C5. On January 9, 2006, for example, CNOOC announced
that it would purchase a large stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field for $2.3 billion in
cash. As a result of the deal, "[CNOOC] would acquire almost half of an oil field
in the Niger Delta, one of the world's largest oil and gas basins." Id. Additionally,
CNOOC also decided to spend "$2.28 billion cash to acquire a 45 percent interest
in an offshore oil license ... from South Atlantic Petroleum of Nigeria." Id.
210. Id.
211. Editorial, Paranoia About Dubai Ports Deal Is Needless: The Bush Administration
Is Right to Defend the Takeover, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 21, 2006, at 16 [here-
inafter Paranoia].
212. These ports are the ports of Miami, New Orleans, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New
York, and New Jersey, all of which are decidedly strategic assets by virtue of their
size, function, and location. Id.
213. Id.
214. Most notably, the fact that the United Arab Emirates is a strategic ally of the
United States in the Middle East. Id.
215. The House of Representatives and the Senate each introduced their own version
of the Foreign Investment Security Act of 2006, a bill specifically created "[t]o
require an investigation under the Defense Production Act of 1950 of the acquisi-
tion by Dubai Ports World of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com-
pany." See S. 2333, 109th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2006); H.R. 4807, 109th Cong. (2nd
Sess. 2006).
216. Robert Wright, SSA Asks Citigroup to Advise on Options, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Mar. 18, 2006, at 21.
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V. CONCLUSION: DOES AMERICA NEED STRONGER
CONTROLS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT?
FDI in U.S. strategic assets is much akin to a hit or miss game; it is
apparently impossible to predict with reasonable certainty the ultimate
success of any purchase offer. Statistics discussed above indicate that the
President's chief tool for protecting national security by voiding foreign
transactions, Exon-Florio, has only really been used once since its enact-
ment.217 Yet, recent history reveals that two high-profile deals died even
before the review process could be initiated. Other mechanisms rather
than the express force of CFIUS review must be at work. Political pres-
sure and the threat of congressional action are two valid guesses. In the
CNOOC-Unocal and DP World cases, foreign investors faced significant
congressional opposition that was ultimately approved by both the House
of Representatives and the Senate individually. In driving these resolu-
tions through the respective houses of Congress, representatives and sen-
ators were outspoken about the negative impact of the transactions. In
time, the foreign investors involved became nervous and disinterested,
and they ultimately withdrew their bids for interest in U.S. strategic
assets.
The mere fact that CNOOC and DP World withdrew their bids, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that an appropriate national security re-
view took place. 218 Nor does it mean that America's best interest was
served in either case. From one perspective, the only arguable take-home
lesson of either situation is that foreign investors should not underesti-
mate the deterrent influence of the American political machine, not mat-
ter how lucrative the deal. In both situations, Congress has placed
national security ahead of America's liberal investment disposition-per-
haps acceptable given the reality of today. The problem, however, is that
without thorough statutory review, the case-by-case approach in each
transaction provides little regularity and poor transparency. Without an
identifiable set of criteria that generally governs the review of foreign
merger or acquisition transactions-which is what Exon-Florio is de-
signed to do-the American public cannot know with any greater cer-
tainty whether congressional lawmakers have made the correct decision.
In neither case did Congress produce a detailed, itemized report where it
reviewed specific aspects of the proposed deal. Rather, congressional
leaders haphazardly held press conferences, gave interviews, and intro-
duced legislation, the product of which was a political snowball against
which CNOOC and DP World had no hope.
This is a situation that requires action and adherence to strict stan-
dards. Oil is an example of a powerful strategic asset on which most oil
dependant nations have placed a tremendous premium. Globalization is
an inescapable movement in which the American economy is heavily in-
217. See supra Section III.B.2.
218. Most notably the fact that the United Arab Emirates is a strategic ally of the
United States in the Middle East. Paranoia, supra note 211, at 16.
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volved and upon which it heavily depends. Foreign companies will likely
continue to make other purchase offers similar to those in CNOOC-Uno-
cal and DP World; this fact is unavoidable. To effectively deal with these
transactions, Congress must follow closely the current mandates of Exon-
Florio and also should modify it to create a legal infrastructure modeled
on industry-specific controls that provide categorical restrictions on for-
eign investment while also offering the opportunity for CFIUS to conduct
a case-by-case review using a set of specific, identifiable criteria. While
congressional leaders are currently working on changes to Exon-Florio to
juggle CFIUS' membership or change CFIUS altogether, 219 these efforts
fall short of the transparency and conciseness that is necessary to guaran-
tee effective, balanced review in the future. 220
Perhaps more controversy is necessary to convince Congress to apply
its efforts not to political snowballing, but to deliberate and thorough re-
view. Curiously, many analysts believe that if CFIUS had had the oppor-
tunity to review the CNOOC-Unocal merger-as CNOOC offered 22 1-
CFIUS would have approved the transaction. 222 While this suggests that
perhaps Congress made a mistake in its hysteria, the fact remains that
without a report conducted in accordance with a set of identifiable crite-
ria, we cannot know with greater certainty if the decision was appropri-
ate. This lack of transparency puts American trade interests and national
security concerns at risk by denying the oversight this process needs.
CFIUS review is supposed to protect national security, but also protect
trade. With appropriate review, we can continue building a safer, yet
more open society.
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Comment and Casenotes

